Benin study finds high biosafety risk across veterinary labs

A new study is putting hard numbers on a persistent weak point in Benin’s health security system: laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. The cross-sectional assessment, published in March 2025 in the Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity, evaluated 96 public and private biomedical and veterinary laboratories and found that most did not comply with established guidance. Overall, 42% of labs were rated very high risk, 38% high risk, 15% moderate risk, and 5% low risk. Among the facilities assessed, 80% of biomedical laboratories and 100% of veterinary laboratories were categorized as high risk. (pure.johnshopkins.edu)

The findings build on earlier warning signs from Benin’s veterinary laboratory network. A 2021 assessment of the country’s veterinary laboratory system concluded that overall capacity was insufficient for detecting infectious threats tied to global health security. That review found low performance in budget, technology, and sample accession, along with staffing shortages and weak collaboration between the country’s veterinary laboratories. A separate assessment of the reference veterinary laboratory in Parakou had already argued that external review of biorisk management was urgent because weaknesses could contribute to broader public health events. (corpuspublishers.com)

In the new paper, researchers said they used the Biosafety and Biosecurity in Laboratory Tool for biomedical laboratories and the Laboratory Mapping Tool for veterinary laboratories, with data collected through KoBoCollect and analyzed in R. The study covered both public and private facilities, which matters because diagnostic capacity in many countries is distributed across mixed systems rather than centralized in one public network. The corresponding Newswise summary highlighted inadequate infrastructure, insufficient training, and weak pathogen containment practices as key contributors to the high-risk ratings. (pure.johnshopkins.edu)

The veterinary angle is especially important because Benin’s labs are part of a broader One Health surveillance chain. Earlier work from the central veterinary laboratory in Parakou showed active efforts to build rabies diagnostic capacity through international collaboration, including support linked to FAO and WOAH-partnered expertise. That makes the new findings more nuanced than a simple story of absence or neglect: there has been capacity-building work, but it appears uneven against the scale of system-wide biosafety and biosecurity needs. That’s an inference based on the contrast between the rabies case report and the broader national risk assessment. (pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov)

At the policy level, the study also lands in step with international guidance that treats biosafety and biosecurity as foundational, not optional. WHO says countries need capacity to safely handle, store, transport, and contain infectious materials across human and animal health sectors, and its stepwise regulatory guidance is aimed specifically at helping national authorities strengthen oversight frameworks. FAO similarly frames biosecurity in animal health systems as central to managing zoonotic disease risk and strengthening resilience. (who.int)

Why it matters: For veterinary professionals, this is really about whether the diagnostic system can be trusted under pressure. If veterinary laboratories lack reliable containment, trained staff, and consistent protocols, the consequences can extend beyond worker safety to sample integrity, turnaround times, disease confirmation, and reporting confidence. In a setting where veterinary labs are already carrying responsibility for zoonotic threats such as avian influenza, anthrax, and Rift Valley fever, biosafety failures can weaken both routine disease control and emergency response. (corpuspublishers.com)

There’s also a practical workforce implication. Labs that operate with weak biosafety culture can struggle to retain trained personnel, standardize procedures, and expand into higher-value testing. For clinicians and veterinary public health teams, that can translate into narrower local diagnostic options, more dependence on referral pathways, and slower decision-making during outbreaks. WHO’s biosafety and biosecurity guidance emphasizes that these systems depend on governance, training, and risk-based management, not just physical infrastructure. (who.int)

What to watch: The next signal will be whether the paper triggers concrete follow-up, such as national corrective action plans, donor-backed infrastructure investment, or expanded biosafety training tied to veterinary and public health laboratories. Benin remains engaged in broader health security and preparedness efforts through WHO-linked platforms, but the key question now is whether this assessment becomes a roadmap for measurable upgrades or simply another documentation of known gaps. (extranet.who.int)